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  “....the only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others.  In the part which concerns himself, his independence 
(of choice) is, of right, absolute......I forgo any advantage which could be derived to 
my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility.  I 
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the interests of man as a progressive being...” (John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty) 
 
Abstract 
 
Numerous interpretations of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism have been proposed (in 
response to the above question) to date.  The interpretation presented in this paper is 
distinctive in that it draws heavily upon multiple utility frameworks, a recent 
development in microeconomic theory.  It is argued that such an analytical 
framework would enable Mill to advocate an absolute right to liberty, without 
betraying utilitarianism.  This conclusion is at variance with Amartya Sen’s key 
Paretian liberal paradox, which establishes conflict between some minimal 
commitment to individual liberty and a social welfare function based upon Paretian 
value judgements.  Generally, one would expect the social objective of utility 
maximisation to be consistent with the objective of maximisation of a Paretian social 
welfare function.  However, the apparent contradiction is explained here by the fact 
that the approach to social welfare implied by Mill’s utilitarianism differs 
fundamentally from the conventional Paretian social welfare function.  The analysis 
is also used to suggest a novel route out of the Sen paradox.   
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I   Introduction 
The idea that there might be conflict between social welfare considerations and 
commitment to individual liberty was first formalised by Amartya Sen in 1970.  
However, prior to Sen’s result, political philosophers such as John Stuart Mill 
advocated commitment to liberty and the social good. The passage quoted at the start 
of the paper summarises Mill’s position:  Individuals have an absolute right to 
liberty in matters which do not harm others, but it is not liberty which is the 
fundamental value judgement, but utility.  Mill’s problem, therefore, is to argue for 
such an absolute right to liberty whilst adhering to the view “that happiness is 
desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only 
desirable as means to that end.”1  There is a link here with the Paretian liberal 
paradox in that Sen has presented us with the result that it is impossible to construct 
a social welfare function which incorporates two conditions (value judgements), one 
reflecting the objective of aggregate utility maximisation (where utility is 
synonymous with preference satisfaction), and another reflecting concern for 
individual liberty (Condition L). Therefore, as a utilitarian advocating an absolute 
right to liberty, Mill would also have had to deal with this logical problem.  Writers 
within the social choice literature referring to Mill have tended to focus exclusively 
on his views on liberty, specifically, on the issue of whether Sen’s Condition L 
adequately captures what Mill meant by a right to liberty, and whether a way out of 
the paradox can be found by considering Mill’s notion of liberty and reformulating 
condition L2.  In this paper, however, I am interested in Mill’s thought to try to shed 
light on the generic conflict between liberty and social welfare, to try to identify how 
Mill dealt with the problem.    The paper shows how Mill reconciles an absolute 
                                                          
1 Mill (1993a), p36. 
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right to liberty in private matters with the idea that there is only one fundamental 
value judgement, utility, by analysing Mill’s notion of utility as a hierarchical utility 
framework3.  It argues that it is his hierarchical notion of utility, distinct from the 
idea of utility as the satisfaction of existing preferences, which is crucial in 
reconciling utility with liberty. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sen’s Paretian liberal paradox is 
discussed in section two.  Section three provides an overview of some recent 
interpretations of Mill’s utilitarianism and outlines the multiple utility idea.  Section 
four sets out the analysis of Mill as a multiple utility framework, and discusses the 
importance of individual liberty within this framework.  In the light of this 
interpretation, we return to the Paretian liberal paradox in section five to assess the 
limited ways out of the conflict.  In the concluding section, we return to the question 
posed in the title to this paper, to critically comment on whether Mill was successful 
or not.   
 
Section II:  Amartya Sen’s Paretian Liberal Paradox 
The Paretian liberal paradox is the result, established by Sen, that it may be 
impossible to construct a social welfare function based upon both Paretian and 
liberal value judgements.  A social welfare function is any function that can be used 
to rank different social states.  Any social welfare function must represent the beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Riley, J. (1989 & 1990), Sugden (1993), Barry (1986).  
3 The only writer to suggest the possibility of such a preference hierarchy in relation to Mill to my 
knowledge, is Brennan (1989).  The hierarchical framework which I develop here, however, differs 
from Brennan’s in that liberty is the necessary condition for preference development.  In the 
framework presented here, individuals choose to develop their preferences and thus make themselves 
better off.  Brennan’s analysis suggests that the preference hierarchy follows from the idea that there 
is a difference in quality between certain types of pleasure which is somewhat unutilitarian.  I discuss 
his comments later (in section four).   
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of some individual or group.  The acceptability of the social welfare function as a 
device to be used for evaluating alternative economic policies obviously rests on the 
acceptability of such ethical belief(s).  To be operational as a device used to make 
actual decisions for society, one would want such a function to be based on value 
judgements (or ethical beliefs) generally accepted by the individuals who make up 
society.     
   
Sen focused specifically on the value judgements underlying a social welfare 
function.  Sen was interested in the possibility of whether the value judgements upon 
which a social welfare function is based could conflict with one another.  In other 
words, he was considering the possibility that a social welfare function might not 
exist for a particular set of value judgements.  The analytical framework used by Sen 
is as follows:  Letters are used to denote social states, where a social state is a 
complete description of society and everyone’s position in it.  The social welfare 
function, in this context, specifies a complete ordering of all possible social states, R, 
for any given set of individual orderings, Ri, where the latter represent the 
preferences of individuals.  Each Ri denotes a ranking of alternatives for a given 
individual.  The social welfare function can be written as follows: 
   R = R (R1,  R2,.....,Rn) 
Value judgements come into the analysis at two levels:  in the individual rankings 
themselves, the Ris, and in the way that they are aggregated to derive a social 
ranking, R.  Further, implicit in the construction of a social welfare function, is the 
idea that social welfare depends only on the welfare of individuals (an individualistic 
approach to social welfare).  Sen was interested in the value judgements involved in 
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the process of aggregating individual preferences, in that he was concerned with 
establishing the existence or otherwise of a social welfare function.4
 
Paretian value judgements can be summarised as (i) Individualism: the welfare of 
society must depend solely on the welfare of individuals who make up that society.  
Further, non-paternalism, that (ii) the individual is the best judge of his own welfare. 
Thus if a social state, x, were unanimously preferred to another, y, then someone 
who accepted Paretian value judgements would judge x to be socially better than y.  
Thus this is the condition which is generally imposed on the social welfare function 
to reflect Paretian value judgements: if x Pi y  for all i, then x P y  (Condition P). 
Sen accepts the idea of a Paretian social welfare function (one which satisfies 
condition P above).  In other words, all regard Paretian value judgements as an 
acceptable ethical basis for the social welfare function, because of their acceptance 
of an individualistic approach to social welfare.  Sen also imposes condition U on 
the social welfare function which represents the idea that no set of individual 
preferences should be excluded from the domain of the function.  In other words, the 
social welfare function should be defined for any possible set of individual 
preferences.  Condition U seems to follow from an acceptance of Paretian value 
judgements: the idea that certain sets of preferences should be excluded from the 
domain of the social welfare function would seem to be inconsistent with the idea 
that the individual is the best judge of his own welfare.      
 
Sen was asking the question as to how liberty might fit into the social welfare 
function, together with Paretianism.  He was concerned that we would want our 
                                                          
4 Strictly speaking Sen was concerned with establishing the existence of a social decision function.  
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social judgements to reflect a commitment to individual liberty as well as 
Paretianism.  More specifically, he was concerned that the social welfare function 
reflect the idea that it is better that individuals be allowed to decide certain private 
matters for themselves irrespective of the views of others.  He therefore imposed a 
further condition on it, condition L, to reflect the value judgement, liberalism.  In 
this case, liberalism can be interpreted as the value judgement that there are certain 
private matters which individuals ought to be free to decide for themselves, 
irrespective of the views held by others.  Sen defines condition L as follows: 
 
“There are at least two individuals such that for each of them there is at least one 
pair of alternatives over which he is decisive, that is, there is a pair of x,y such that if 
he prefers x (respectively y) to y (respectively x), then society should prefer x 
(respectively y) to y (respectively x)”.   
 
The impossibility result is formally stated as, 
“Theorem II.  There is no social decision function that can simultaneously satisfy 
Conditions U, P, and L*.”5
 
Thus, if utility is synonymous with preference satisfaction, condition P is consistent 
with the utilitarian objective of aggregate utility maximisation.  Condition L is 
motivated by concern for individual liberty.  Thus Sen has presented us with the 
result that it may be impossible to construct a utilitarian social welfare function 
                                                                                                                                                                    
See note 5. 
5 Sen, A.K. (1970b) p154.  The difference between a social decision function and social welfare 
function is purely technical: a social welfare function imposes the requirement that the ranking of 
alternative social states be transitive, whereas a social decision function imposes the weaker 
requirement that it be acyclical.  Thus the result also applies to a social welfare function.  I prefer to 
adopt the term ‘welfare function’ because of the reference to welfare.    
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(where utility is preference satisfaction), which incorporates a commitment to 
individual liberty.  Note that it is the attempt to construct a social welfare function 
(the attempt to aggregate individual preferences to identify the socially best 
outcome), which precipitates the result.  This is crucially important.  The conflict is 
not between Paretian and liberal value judgements in isolation, but between liberal 
value judgements and the use of a Paretian social welfare function to determine the 
best outcome. With this result in mind, we return to the work of Mill. 
 
III  Recent Interpretations of Mill’s Utilitarianism and the Multiple Utility Idea 
This section provides an overview of some of the recent interpretations of Mill’s 
notion of utility that have been proposed.  It also outlines key features of the generic 
multiple utility idea, and highlights the distinctiveness of the interpretation of Mill 
proposed here. 
 
Generally, writers try to reconcile Mill’s admittance of utility as the sole value with 
his reference to higher and lower pleasures.  The problem is that, if there is an 
intrinsic difference between higher and lower pleasures, i.e. a difference independent 
of utility considerations, then Mill has introduced some value other than utility and 
thus betrays the utilitarian ethic.  However, if higher pleasures merely embody a 
greater quantity of pleasure than lower pleasures, then there would be no need for 
the qualitative distinction between the two types of pleasure.  The utilitarian 
argument for liberty presents a similar problem:  Referring to the quote at the 
opening of this paper, Mill advocates an absolute right to liberty in matters which 
are private, which suggests that liberty is of intrinsic value.  Yet he also states that 
the “ultimate appeal on all ethical questions must be utility”.  The latter implies that 
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the right to liberty is not absolute, but dependent on utility considerations, hence the 
apparent contradiction. 
 
Riley (1988, 1992 and 1999) focuses on the pleasures themselves.  His interpretation 
of Mill’s utilitarianism is as a hierarchy of pleasures, but one where “a difference of 
quality is an infinite difference of quantity” (page 294, 1992).  The basis for the 
hierarchy is that an individual prefers a pleasure of higher quality to any number of 
units of a pleasure of lower quality.  Long (1992) shifts the focus from particular 
acitivities to an individual’s character, or “entire mode of life”.  He argues that 
Mill’s utilitarianism is best understood as entailing a hierarchy of characters.  Long 
argues that choice of a higher (lower) pleasure is tantamount to choice of a noble 
(base) character.  The higher pleasure is chosen because the individual gets more 
pleasure out of being the type of person that chooses higher pleasures all the time as 
opposed to being one who often chooses lower pleasures:  “We choose to be a 
certain kind of person, namely, one who chooses the higher pleasures”.  Thus on this 
view, it is the hierarchy of characters that is of primary importance.   
 
Mainstream microeconomic theory assumes that individuals can rank alternative 
actions in a single ordering, from most preferred to least preferred action.  The 
generic multiple utility idea is that two or more rankings of alternatives are needed to 
analyse an individual’s choices6. This might be because the individual has 
conflicting motivations, e.g. moral versus pleasure considerations, or the public good 
versus own private good.  It has been argued that the two distinct motives of e.g. 
moral considerations and selfish pleasure considerations implies that “choices do not 
                                                          
6 A range of multiple utility frameworks are summarised and critically assessed in Brennan (1989). 
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reflect simple, one-dimensional, preferences but are multifaceted” 7  In other words, 
these distinct motivations on the part of an individual mean that an analytical 
framework where more than one ranking of alternative actions is attributed to the 
individual is necessary, or at least better, to analyse individual choice compared to a 
framework where individuals are assumed to be able to rank all actions in a single 
ordering8. 
 
Although the term ‘multiple utility’ usually refers to the number of utility functions 
attributed to an individual at a given point in time, in this paper it is used to analyse 
the transformation of an individual’s utility function over time. It is not that different 
rankings of alternatives are assigned to individuals in accordance with different 
motivations.  The exercise of independent choice enables an individual to transform 
her existing set of preferences into preferences, which she ultimately regards as 
better.  Developed preferences are better than undeveloped ones, thus there is a 
hierarchy of utility functions (or sets of preferences) implicit in Mill’s notion of 
utility.  Traditionally, interpretations of Mill focus on his pleasure hierarchy.  The 
distinctiveness of this approach lies in the focus on a hierarchy of sets of 
preferences, and it is this shift of focus which facilitates the reconciliation of liberty 
with admittance of utility as the sole value. 
IV  Mill’s Notion of Utility Analysed as a Multiple Utility Framework, and the 
Importance of Individual Liberty 
                                                          
7 Etzioni, p177. 
8 Other writers who have argued for such a framework are as follows:  Harsanyi(1977) suggested the 
idea of an individual having preferences based on social considerations and those relating to what he 
actually prefers. More recently, Howard Margolis (1981 and 1982) formulated a model of rational 
choice in which the individual was conceived of as having two different “selves” reflecting two 
distinct motivations:  public good and private, or selfish, good.  Etzioni and Lutz defend the idea of 
the multiple utility framework whilst Brennan is opposed, taking the view that any motive can be 
captured by a single utility framework. 
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Central to the interpretation presented here is that Mill’s notion of utility is not 
merely preference satisfaction, but Mill does make reference to what can loosely be 
regarded as a set of individual preferences or utility function (‘faculties’ in the 
passage below).  Further, the individual’s happiness is clearly dependent on these 
‘faculties’ which is analogous to the modern notion of utility and the individual 
utility function: 
 
“human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when 
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not 
include their gratification”9
 
To put the above quote in context, Mill was responding to the charge that 
utilitarianism was a “doctrine worthy only of swine”10.  His defence, interpreted in 
terms of the preference model, was that human beings and swine have different 
utility functions and therefore that from which they derive utility differs.  At this 
point in ‘Utilitarianism’, Mill goes no further than that.  This is the essential 
similarity between the single preference model paradigm of economic theory and 
Mill’s notion of utility.  The difference lies in Mill’s refusal to accept preferences as 
brute facts making the notion of utility broader than satisfaction of existing 
preferences.  The passage above is discussed further at the end of this section after 
developing a preference model to represent Mill’s notion of utility.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
  
9 Mill, J.S (1993a), p8. 
10 Mill (1993a) p7. 
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Mill’s model of utility is dynamic in that preferences are not static.  Individual 
liberty provides the individual with the opportunity to transform his preferences such 
that he ultimately regards himself as better off.  Mill is able to incorporate such an 
idea within a utilitarian framework by arguing that the individual who has developed 
his preferences prefers his situation post-preference development to his situation 
prior to it.  In other words, although utility is no longer synonymous with preference 
satisfaction, the test of utility is still the individual: 
 
“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.  And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different 
opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.”11
 
The distinction between happiness and ‘content’ is of fundamental importance to 
Mill’s model of utility.  In terms of a preference model of utility, ‘content’ is the 
extent to which one’s individual utility function, or set of preferences, is satisfied.  
The notion of utility (happiness), however, is broader than this as the above quote 
illustrates:  The fool, or the pig, has a very simple utility function (set of 
preferences).  He is not a critical thinker (for he is a fool), he merely requires 
sufficient income to enable him to afford the material means to satisfy his simple 
wants such as food, drink and sensual pleasure.  Socrates’ utility function is far more 
complex than the fool’s because he is more intelligent, he thinks critically.  He is 
thus less likely to be satisfied, but he still considers himself better off (more utility).  
Socrates has increased his utility by actually changing his utility function into one 
which he ultimately prefers to the one he had initially, prior to exercising his 
                                                          
11 Mill, J.S (1993a), p10. 
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autonomy, despite the fact that he is now less content.   Since he prefers the 
transformed utility function, he must derive more utility from it. Socrates has 
experience of both utility functions and prefers his utility function post-education.  If 
the fool should claim to prefer being a fool to being Socrates, this can be ignored 
because the fool has no experience of what it is to have the preferences of ‘Socrates’ 
(he ‘only knows his own side of the question’). 
 
Thus the individual is still sovereign, but his preferences are not.  Another way of 
analysing this would be to say that the individual is implicitly expressing a 
preference over two sets of preferences, and he prefers his developed ones: 
 
“no intelligent being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person an ignoramus, 
no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they 
should be persuaded that the fool is better satisfied with their lot than they are with 
theirs.  They would not resign what they possess for the most complete satisfaction 
of all the desires which they have in common with theirs.”12
 
The fool is more satisfied because he is an unquestioning fool and it is thus easier to 
satisfy him.  But, once the individual has been able to change his utility function 
(through the exercise of choice, making mistakes) such that he thinks critically and 
questions, he is less likely to be satisfied since his wants are more complex, but he 
prefers this situation to the one previously where he was uneducated.  The educated 
individual is expressing a preference for a utility function (set of preferences).  There 
is nothing perverse in this idea of the educated individual being better off, i.e. having 
                                                          
12 Mill, J.S (1993a), p9. 
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more utility, than he had prior to education provided one lets go of a narrow idea of 
utility as contentment or some Benthamite pleasure index.  The individual is still 
sovereign, but we now have a broader framework which allows for preference 
development over time and means that the goodness or otherwise of social states is 
not solely evaluated in terms of existing preferences.  
 
Timothy Brennan cites Mill’s notion of utility as an example of a hierarchical 
preference structure13, but Brennan’s interpretation of the above passage is 
somewhat confusing.  Brennan suggests that the hierarchy applies to the ‘pleasures’ 
themselves rather than the preferences:    
 
“An educated person may be no more capable of deriving pleasure from mud 
wrestling than an uneducated person is from opera.  If education precludes deriving 
pleasure from the activities of the fool, there is no ‘revealed preference’ for the 
‘higher preferences’”14
 
The confusion is exacerbated by the fact that Brennan uses the term ‘higher 
preferences’ where what he is talking about are actually (higher) pleasures.  Brennan 
is taking the utility function of the educated individual as given and considering his 
choice of ‘pleasure’.  This is quite different to the question addressed by Mill which 
is whether an educated individual ‘would consent to be a fool’. Being a fool means 
having a fool’s utility function, not experiencing a fool’s pleasures as an educated 
individual.  The educated individual can express a preference for being educated 
                                                          
13 Brennan, T.J. (1989) p191-2. 
14 Ibid, Note 2, p191. 
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since he has experience of both, but the fool cannot since he only has experience of 
being a fool (he ‘only knows his own side of the question’). 
 
Thus the utility (preference) framework is hierarchical.  This is the feature which 
distinguishes Mill’s notion of utility from the mono-utility paradigm of economic 
theory.  Although each individual only has a single set of preferences at a given 
point in time, this set of preferences can in some cases be transformed into a set 
which is better.  Individual preferences are not passively accepted as brute facts, 
they are not viewed as equally good.   
 
I shall now return to the passage relating to the different ideas of happiness of human 
beings and animals, noted at the start of this section15.  I used this passage at the 
beginning of the section to highlight the fact that Mill does make reference to some 
kind of individual preferences or utility function.  But the passage can also be used 
to further illustrate the fact that the test of utility is the preference of the autonomous 
individual.  Mill notes that human beings ‘when once made conscious’ of their ‘more 
elevated’ faculties ‘do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their 
gratification’.  This italicised phrase is the key as to why human beings or intelligent 
individuals are the judge of which set of preferences is ‘better’ and not the fools.   
The fool is not conscious of what it is to have a more complex utility function, this 
experience is, therefore outside his experience.  It is thus impossible for him to 
express a preference for being a satisfied fool since he is incapable of experiencing 
being a dissatisfied educated person (‘dissatisfied Socrates’).  The educated human, 
however, is ‘conscious’ of both experiences, and thus one can infer from his 
                                                          
15 Mill (1993a), p8. 
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preference which of the two sets of preferences gives him more utility (which is 
better).  
 
The Importance of Individual Liberty 
Underlying Mill’s whole argument for liberty and why it is consistent with 
maximisation of utility, is his idea of what it is to be human - that humans are 
capable of criticising and reasoning and thus have the potential to increase utility via 
the act of choice.  The idea of merely taking a set of existing preferences and 
maximising satisfaction (content) is far too limiting because it ignores the potential 
that the exercise of choice has for making us better off.  Thus individual utility is not 
a static concept.  Rowley and Peacock support this view of Mill’s characterisation of 
what it is to be human.  However, Rowley and Peacock state that liberty is of value 
in itself: 
 
“This fundamental notion that the essence of humanity lies in the capacity to 
choose...  ...implies that individuals must be granted the widest possible freedom of 
choice...if they are to develop their capacities....The essence of liberalism is 
freedom, therefore, not as an instrument, or even as a human preference, but as an 
ethical value in itself....”16  
 
The italicised phrase above is illuminating in highlighting the fact that Mill’s whole 
reconciliation of the liberty/utility issue is dependant on his view of humans:  to 
realise utility in the fullest sense, it is necessary that individuals develop their 
preferences hence the need for liberty.  Thus liberty is instrumental in securing 
                                                          
16 Rowley and Peacock (1975) p79. 
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maximum utility for individuals.  There is still only one fundamental value, yet this 
is lost in the above, despite the illuminating opening phrase.   
 
Further evidence for the importance of liberty for individual well being can be found 
in the passage below, taken from On Liberty: 
 
“He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has 
no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.....It is possible that he 
might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm’s way.  But what will be 
his comparative worth as a human being?”17
 
Thus the exercise of choice is imperative if we are to realise our full potential as 
human beings.  The act of individual choice has a fundamentally important role to 
play in enabling individuals to develop their preferences and thus make themselves 
better off. 
 
The orthodox social welfare function used by Sen involves the construction of a 
ranking of alternatives, which is representative of the social good.  It is a somewhat 
mechanistic approach to social welfare in that a ranking of alternative social states is 
derived solely from existing individual preferences.  The view of social welfare 
taken by Mill is utilitarian, however, given the importance that he places on 
preference development as a means of increasing utility, to think of it as being 
represented as such a static ranking of alternatives is misleading.  Given the 
importance of preference development to increase individual utility, to represent 
                                                          
17 Mill, p.126-127. Italics added. 
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social welfare as a mechanistic aggregation of preferences does not seem consistent 
with the broader notion of utility argued for here.   
 
Mill’s ideas on liberty are almost invariably used to argue for a procedural 
formulation of rights, e.g. game forms, where, implicitly, the social welfare function 
is absent.  But this leaves unanswered the question, “where does the social welfare 
function go?”.  Despite Mill’s insistence on the importance of liberty, it is a question 
that needs to be addressed, given his adherence to utilitarianism.  Peacock and 
Rowley discuss this social welfare issue:    
 
“.... liberals in the tradition of Mill are not convinced of the existence of objective 
immutable truth, but believe that a good society is one that is uncertain of its truths 
and dedicates itself, not to an ideal, but to an eternal search.  For liberals, fallibility 
and the right to err are viewed as necessary corollaries to the capacity for self-
improvement...”18
 
This passage brings out the difference between the approaches to social welfare of 
Sen and Mill.  In the Paretian liberal paradox, we are trying to identify the outcome 
that is best for society, given the acceptance of Paretianism and liberalism.  We have 
the result that a social welfare function might not exist for some configuration of 
individual preferences.  In other words, it might not be possible to identify a social 
outcome, which is “best” for society.  This is only a problem if we are committed to 
the idea that, in theory, there must always be some outcome that is best for society 
(in that case, there must always exist a social welfare function).  Rousseau was 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
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committed to this idea, it was his idea of the general will.  I would argue that Mill, 
although a utilitarian, was not.  Given the emphasis placed on the process of 
individual development by Mill, the idea of an “eternal search” for the social good is 
helpful because it serves to emphasise the fact that the social good for Mill is 
constantly changing with the changing values of individuals.  The idea of a single 
best outcome, which we have with a social welfare function, is more appropriate 
when utility is synonymous with preference satisfaction.  However, a necessary 
implication of Mill’s adherence to utilitarianism is that there is, in theory, a socially 
best outcome, which is the outcome that produces the “greatest utility of the greatest 
number”.  
 
Mill links the process of individual development to social welfare in his essay On 
Liberty: 
“In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more 
valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.  There 
is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in 
the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them”19  
 
The italicised phrase above obviously relates to his utilitarian approach to social 
welfare, that the welfare of society is the sum of the welfares of individuals.  Thus 
maximum social utility requires individual liberty in order that individuals may 
develop and realise their full potential as human beings.  Individual liberty is 
necessary because Mill is interested in “utility in the largest sense, grounded on the 
interests of man as a progressive being”, as quoted at the start of the paper. 
                                                          
19 Mill, p.131. 
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 V Limited Ways Out of the Paretian Liberal Paradox 
In the Paretian liberal paradox, Sen has presented us with a result which suggests 
that it is logically inconsistent to be committed to all of the following three ideas: 
1. Acceptance of Paretian value judgements (condition P) 
2. Some minimal commitment to individual liberty (condition L) 
3. Acceptance of a social welfare function as representative of social good. 
 
Point three above constitutes a third value judgement, but this is often overlooked 
within the social choice literature.  This leads inevitably to an interpretation of Sen’s 
result as a conflict between just two value judgements, Paretianism and liberalism 
per se.  Yet, provided one rejects the idea of a social welfare function, there is no 
necessary conflict between these ideas.  It is the attempt to incorporate liberty into a 
Paretian social welfare function which precipitates the impossibility result.  Sen has 
presented us with a particular view of liberty and social welfare which seems to be 
logically inconsistent.  The paradox thus poses the question: 
 
“What views of liberty and social welfare are logically consistent?” 
 
This section considers how the analysis of John Stuart Mill helps us to find an 
answer to this question. 
 
Three answers are suggested immediately from inspection of Sen’s result itself.  One 
can accept any two of the value judgements, provided one lets go of the third.  This 
implies the following logically consistent positions on liberty and social welfare: 
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 1. Commitment to a Paretian social welfare function, but abandonment of some 
minimal commitment to individual liberty. 
2. Commitment to Paretian value judgements and the desirability of individual 
liberty.  But rejection of the concept of social welfare as something which can be 
represented by a social welfare function. 
3. Commitment to the desirability of individual liberty and the concept of a social 
welfare function.  But rejection of Paretian value judgements. 
 
The third position seems untenable (or unreasonable).  It is hard to imagine a 
meaningful concept of social welfare which is not a function of the welfares of 
individuals (either individual private welfare or the individual’s view of social 
welfare).  This leaves the viewpoints presented in one and two.  Focusing first on 
point one, we are left with Sugden’s vision of the social welfare function as 
“dictatorial decision-maker”20, i.e. serious commitment to the idea of a social 
welfare function rules out any commitment to individual liberty.  Mill was 
committed to some form of social welfare function and individual liberty, and seems 
to have come up against conflict between the two.  Perhaps the most interesting 
point about this is the fact that Mill had a distinctly different view of social welfare, 
i.e. although a utilitarian, his idea of the social good does not fit with the analytical 
framework of social choice theory where social good is derived by aggregating 
individual preferences.  This suggests that the conflict between liberty and social 
welfare identified by Sen is fundamental.  Instead of being merely symptomatic of 
                                                          
20 Sugden (1978) 
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the particular kind of social welfare function Sen was constructing, the underlying 
logical problem is caused by the social welfare function in whatever form. 
 
According to Mill, liberty provides an individual with the opportunity to transform 
her utility function into one which she ultimately prefers (thus more utility).  Social 
welfare follows as the sum of the utilities of separate individuals.  It is the multiple 
(or dual) utility idea which pre-empts any conflict between maximum aggregate 
happiness and individual liberty:  Individual liberty is necessary in order that 
individuals can develop their existing preferences into “higher” (better) ones.  
Liberty is necessary in order for individuals to bring about a change in themselves.  
Given Mill’s behavioural assumption that individuals will choose to develop their 
higher (and not their lower) faculties, and will view themselves as better off after 
such a preference transformation, he has a utilitarian justification for the hierarchy 
and liberty will increase social welfare.  Within the social choice literature there has 
been a tendency to ‘resolve’ conflict by choosing between commitment to individual 
liberty and acceptance of a Paretian social welfare function, (or later abandoning the 
social welfare function altogether).  Thus the adoption of a multiple utility device 
would appear to be the only way out of position one above (acceptance of a social 
welfare function).  
 
Section VI:  Conclusion:  Did Mill Reconcile Commitment To Liberty With 
Admittance Of A Single Value – Utility? 
This paper has argued for an interpretation of Mill’s utilitarianism as a hierarchy of 
utility functions (faculties), rather than the conventional interpretation as a hierarchy 
of pleasures:  Individual liberty is a necessary condition for individual well being, or 
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utility, because it is through the exercise of autonomous choice that individuals 
develop their existing preferences and transform them.  Post preference 
development, the individual might require more to satisfy her, or to make her 
content, however, she prefers her enlightened situation to her situation prior to 
preference development.  This is why it is better, on utilitarian grounds, to be 
“Socrates dissatisfied” as opposed to a “satisfied fool” – it is the individual who 
prefers to be the former over the latter.  Implicit in the argument is a behavioural 
assumption about human nature, that individuals will view themselves as better off 
after developing their “higher” faculties.    
 
To summarise the analysis of Mill’s utilitarianism:    
1. (Mill’s assumption about human nature.)  An individual will prefer his situation 
after the development of his higher faculties (and thus his preferences), even if 
he feels less content.     
2. The test of utility is the preference of the informed individual (the individual 
who has experience of both states, of having developed and undeveloped 
preferences). 
3. A hierarchy of preferences follows from points one and two above:  The 
‘instructed person’ has more utility than he did when ‘an ignoramus’, and thus 
the preferences of the instructed person are better than those of the ignoramus on 
utility grounds. 
 
Thus Mill’s utilitarian justification for individual liberty is contingent on individuals 
using that liberty in a particular way (to develop their intellect – it is better to be 
Socrates than a fool).  Mill’s utilitarian justification for individual liberty is based on 
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the existence of a preference hierarchy, where individual liberty is the means to 
increasing utility by enabling individuals to develop their ‘higher faculties’.  But the 
utilitarian argument for individual liberty is dependent on individuals choosing to 
develop their higher faculties as opposed to what could be thought of as their lower 
faculties. It is freedom to develop one’s higher faculties which is good, not freedom 
to develop one’s lower faculties. If individuals chose some pursuit which instead 
transformed their preferences in a negative way, then one could use the hierarchical 
utility argument to justify denying individuals liberty.  The argument which was 
used in the (1961) attempt to ban the book “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” can be 
interpreted in precisely this way. Quoting from the trial itself: 
 
“the charge is that the tendency of the book is to corrupt and deprave.  The charge is 
not that the tendency of the book is either to shock or disgust.”21  
The defence defined, ‘to deprave and corrupt’ in the following way: 
“to deprave and corrupt obviously involves a change of character leading the reader 
to do something wrong that he would not otherwise have done.”22
 
In terms of preference theory, to corrupt and deprave is to transform an individual’s 
preferences, whereas the terms ‘shock’ and ‘disgust’ are reactions which are 
dependant on existing preferences, but leave the preferences themselves unchanged. 
There is clearly a hierarchical utility framework implicit in this argument, but in this 
case individual liberty (freedom to read the book) enables the individual to transform 
his preferences such that he becomes worse off.  Thus in this case, transformation of 
individual preferences is being used as an argument against individual liberty.  Mill 
                                                          
21 Rolph, C.H. (1961), p13.  
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does not entertain the possibility of liberty facilitating such a negative transformation 
of preferences, but he does deal with the objection that those who have supposedly 
developed their higher faculties are sometimes “tempted” to choose the lower 
pleasures. His response is as follows: 
 
“Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they 
have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to 
inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are 
either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any 
longer capable of enjoying.”23
 
Having developed one’s higher faculties, one needs to exercise them, otherwise 
one’s preferences will degenerate to the lower ones one had before: 
 
“capacity for the nobler feelings (higher faculties) is in most natures a very tender 
plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance”24
 
These passages hint at an element of paternalism in Mill’s notion of utility.  Each 
individual is free to choose for himself, but if he chooses an ‘inferior pleasure’, then 
it is not said to reflect an underlying preference, it merely reflects the fact that he has 
not nurtured (to adopt the plant metaphor used by Mill) his higher preferences, but 
allowed them to degenerate. The individual who has previously developed his higher 
preferences, but then chooses to allow his preferences to transform back to those of a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Ibid., p29. 
23 Mill, J.S. (1993), p11. 
24 Ibid.  
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fool as he chooses sensual over intellectual gratification is deemed to be ‘addicted’ 
to lower pleasures rather than expressing a deliberate preference. By dismissing the 
individual’s own preference as ‘addiction’, there is a sense in which Mill is imposing 
his own view of the welfare of individuals. Mill is not prepared to allow for the 
possibility of some individuals preferring being satisfied fools to dissatisfied 
Socrates, even after experiencing both states! 
  
However, if one accepts Mill’s behavioural assumption about human nature, then the 
argument for absolute freedom in matters which concern only oneself is entirely 
consistent with preference development and thus utility maximisation.  Further, 
Mill’s ideas highlight the narrowness of a concept of utility as solely simple, 
unquestioning, preference satisfaction.  Mill wanted to emphasise the role of 
enlightenment, of opening individuals to new ideas/activities (which they might be 
sceptical of at first) in improving their welfare.  The following discussion of the 
value of originality taken from his essay ‘On Liberty’ is helpful in understanding 
why he distinguishes his notion of utility from the satisfaction of a given set of 
preferences: 
 
“...in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that 
it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well 
without it.  Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at.  Originality is the one 
thing that unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of.  They cannot see what it is to do 
for them: how should they?  If they could see what it would do for them, it would not 
be originality.  The first service that originality has to render them, is that of 
opening their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being 
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themselves original.  Meanwhile....let them be modest enough to believe that there is 
something still left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in 
need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want.”25   
 
The argument above can be summarised as, individuals prefer having their eyes 
opened (once opened) but when their eyes are closed, they have no desire to open 
them.  This highlights the weakness of viewing existing individual preferences as a 
benchmark of the goodness or otherwise of outcomes.  If utility is nothing more than 
existing preference satisfaction and this is combined with the utilitarian social 
objective of maximising the sum of these individual utilities, it could lead to denying 
individuals the opportunity to develop and transform their preferences (in denying 
them individual liberty).  Without this liberty, they would be content, but would 
remain with their eyes closed, in blissful ignorance of how much better off they 
could have been had they been given the liberty to open them. 
                                                          
25 Mill, J.S., p.133-134. 
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